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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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SUMMARY

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Shah now reported willing to continue support of Zahedi (page 4).

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FAR EAST

25X1A1. South Korean chief of staff reports on purpose of Formosa visit:

South Korean army chief of staff Chong Il-kwon has specifically denied to American embassy officials that he was under instructions to negotiate any agreements with the Chinese Nationalists during his recent visit to Taipei. He asserted that his visit was for the purpose of obtaining information on the current situation and to observe the training of Nationalist troops.

Chong, who apparently was unimpressed by the Nationalist army, said he had suggested to the Chinese that it would be good strategy for them to withdraw from the offshore islands. If the Communists then attacked Formosa and the Pesquadores, the security of which is guaranteed by the United States, general hostilities would develop and these would spread to Korea.


Comment: Both Seoul and Taipei are aware of their military dependence on the United States and neither has shown enthusiasm for an alliance which did not include Washington. Rhee reportedly sees little advantage in a bilateral alliance with Nationalist China, which he considers to be a waning power.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

25X1A 3. Shah now reported willing to continue support of Zahedi:

 The Shah has decided to continue his support of Prime Minister Zahedi but intends to make several cabinet changes,

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Comment: These reported actions of the Shah may have been designed to stop the intensive Iranian political maneuvering until his return later this week. In view of the long-standing disagreements between the Shah and Zahedi, any new collaboration between them will probably be short-lived.

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